华盛顿邮报本周末的一篇文章报道了一项新策略，即共和党参议员在为特朗普总统几乎肯定的弹劾审判做准备时，正在升国旗。他们可能承认“特朗普对乌克兰的交换条件”，但辩称这一点并不违法“或者值得弹劾。

这不仅在法律上没有意义，而且突出了一个越来越紧迫的问题，这个问题很少有人问。现在滚雪球般的交换证据变得如此坚如磐石，以至于即使特朗普最顽固的铁杆支持者也感受到了承认这一点的政治压力，一个问题需要得到回答:为什么司法部没有对特朗普的行为展开正式的刑事调查？

“我们现在所知道的事实勾勒出了违反反贿赂法规的犯罪可能性，”保罗·罗森茨威格说，他曾是独立法律顾问肯·斯塔尔白水调查公司的高级顾问，现在是R街研究所的高级研究员。"除了总统之外，总统还有其他人吗？这就足以说明要展开调查了。"

当然，早些时候，在总统7月25日致电乌克兰总统沃洛季米尔·泽兰斯基后不久，DOJ就迅速了解了当时对该电话的了解。一位发言人在两个月后向国会解释说，当时，该部门根据1971年联邦选举活动法(FECA)认定“没有违反竞选资金”张贴。该法律禁止征集一个"有价值的东西"与联邦选举有关的外国国民"司法部律师认定，根据法律，对政府调查的帮助不能被量化为“有价值的东西”张贴报道。

 

2019年9月25日，在联合国大会期间，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普和乌克兰总统沃洛迪米尔·泽伦斯基在纽约的一次会议上发表讲话。

同样早些时候，国会中的民主党人——可能对长达22个月的穆勒调查感到厌倦——决定不再陷入特朗普的行为是否构成刑事犯罪的技术细节中，而是将注意力集中在他们视为明显可弹劾的滥用权力和违反公众信任的行为上。

但由于早期的战术决策，人们有可能对日益增多的犯罪证据麻木不仁。

当然，从一开始，有些人就不同意DOJ的初步结论，即没有发生竞选资金违规。

“你必须能够将‘有价值的东西’量化到五分之一的想法——我认为这是错误的，”斯图尔特·格森说，他是前美国代理司法部长，乔治·布什总统领导下的司法部民事司前司长，今天是爱泼斯坦·贝克尔&格林公司的合伙人。“对你和你的竞选团队来说，获得对手的丑闻是有价值的，这一点当然有争议。”

但今天更紧迫的问题是特朗普的行为是否违反了联邦贿赂和小费法:18南加州大学第201科。这是一个DOJ在最初的快速调查中似乎没有解决的问题，可能是因为在那个时候，交换的证据仍然是间接的和推测的。

情况不再是这样了。代理美国驻乌克兰大使的具体证词小威廉·泰勒。；中校亚历山大·温德曼；美国驻欧盟大使戈登·桑德兰；和国家安全委员会助理蒂莫西·莫里森，连同其他佐证(例如，桑德拉-泰勒案)甚至承认所有这些都强烈指向交换。

具体而言，他们暗示特朗普将向乌克兰提供近3.91亿美元国会批准的军事援助作为条件，因为乌克兰公开宣布对乌克兰能源公司布里斯马等进行刑事调查。这一调查必然会给那里的前导演亨特·拜登蒙上阴影，他是乔·拜登的儿子，而乔·拜登是特朗普在下届总统选举中的民主党对手。(乔·拜登也是民主党候选人，当时他在与特朗普的直接民意测验中表现最佳。)

这贿赂法将任何联邦“公职人员”索取或寻求“任何有价值的东西”定为重罪...作为在任何官方行为中受到影响的回报。”(最高刑期为15年。)

显然，特朗普的一些辩护律师想争辩说，好吧，确实有交换条件，但特朗普仍然没有“腐败”

当然，被告总是可以向陪审团提出这样的论点——而且通常如此。但是这里有足够的证据证明个人利益；没有合法公共目的的客观证据；数月的偷偷摸摸；保密；和罪恶感。职业特使、大使和国家安全人员都被蒙在鼓里，而只有少数政治任命者和总统私人律师知道正在发生的事情。为什么特朗普-泽兰斯基电话会议的备忘录被放在超安全“码字”服务器？为什么是温德曼的修改备忘录中从未包含的内容？为什么是温德曼受教育的不讨论电话吗？特朗普为什么一直保持错误坚持电话备忘录是“逐字记录”...被非常有才华的速记员录下"？

也许这些问题有无辜的答案——但这就是为什么需要进行全面的刑事调查。如果这些问题的答案不是无辜的，他们会提出是否还有其他联邦刑法被违反的问题——特别是妨碍司法公正的法律。

无论如何，《美国法典》第18编第201条也规定了更容易证明的轻罪(最高刑期:两年)，甚至不要求证明“腐败”意图。该条款通常被称为“酬金”条款，涵盖任何要求或寻求“个人为或将由该官员或个人实施的任何官方行为或由于该行为而实施的任何有价值的东西”的官员司法部通常占据位置被告只需要“故意”在小费案件中犯罪。

没有人质疑总统是否被南加州大学第18章第201节所涵盖。

最高法院以常识的方式解释了交换条件。安东尼·肯尼迪法官在1992年写道:“官员和付款人不需要用明确的措辞来表示交换条件。”赞同这已经成为一个被广泛接受的法律声明，“否则法律的效果可能会因为知道眨眼和点头而受挫。”

这个案件的事实是否会与DOJ在竞选金融法中发现的问题相冲突——在这个案例中提取的“任何有价值的东西”都无法量化？

不，根据一小堆判例法。在涉及《美国法典》第18编第201节以及措辞类似的联邦和州贿赂法的案件中，法院有很多机会来解决这个问题。在这种情况下，法院一再发现“无形”利益可以算作“任何有价值的东西”。

“贿赂法规的‘有价值的东西’被解释得非常宽泛，可以包括对公职人员有主观价值的任何东西，”兰德尔·埃利亚松说，他是DC华盛顿的前助理美国律师，在乔治·华盛顿大学法学院教授白领犯罪。“它可以包括无形资产，如提供就业机会、未来合同承诺、性服务、个人服务等。。。。我相信调查政治对手的承诺是有资格的。”

“术语‘任何有价值的东西’...新奥尔良联邦上诉法院在一份报告中写道1996年贿赂案。“法令的简单含义迫使我们得出结论，‘任何有价值的东西’...包括涉及无形物品的交易”——在这种情况下，就是夫妻探访监狱。

其他难以量化的服务和利益构成了贿赂起诉成功的基础。这些措施包括给予审前释放宽松的条件，给予商业上毫无价值的股票，这些股票后来可能会增值，以及——也许在这里最相关的——一项不参加初选的协议。我对判例法的快速回顾表明，至少五 同盟的 电路 法院关于呼吁我发现“任何有价值的东西”一词包括贿赂案件中无形的或难以量化的利益，但没有人做出相反的裁决。

乔治·华盛顿大学的埃利亚松在一封电子邮件中说:“我认为DOJ调查这些潜在贿赂违规行为有坚实的基础。”。“这可能需要任命一名新的特别顾问——你可以自己评估[·比尔·巴尔担任司法部长的可能性有多大。”

另一方面，格尔森不赞成特别检察官的介入。他更信任巴尔和他的部门——尽管他不同意该部门在此案中对竞选金融法的解释，而且在此之前，他对巴尔对穆勒报告的描述持有异议。“我相信这个机构和其中的职业人士的素质，”他说。(20世纪70年代初，作为一名助理美国律师，格森领导了一项里程碑式的起诉，起诉了一名在《美国法典》第18编第201节下的现任美国参议员。)

格尔森甚至怀疑特朗普的行为最终是否会在已经开始的调查中受到审查。纽约海流的南区据报告的鲁道夫·朱利安尼与乌克兰有关的工作已经导致四人被起诉，对他的调查可能最终需要对特朗普的行为进行审查。“这一切都与乌克兰有关，”格尔森说。"这一切都与同样的情况有关。"

然而，如果格森是错的，该部门迄今为止的无所作为只能意味着另外两件事之一。也许该部门已经决定，悬而未决的弹劾调查足以充实事实并给予惩罚。弹劾调查当然是合适的。贿赂是显而易见的宪法的埃利亚松指出的弹劾理由(“叛国、贿赂或其他重罪或轻罪”)。格尔森指出，由于这里涉及的“有价值的东西”来自乌克兰，它也可能是外国薪酬——这是弹劾的另一个依据。

但缺乏平行的刑事调查往往会降低公众和弹劾陪审员——参议员——眼中指控的严重性。如果总统最终被害怕面对主要对手的政治盟友宣布无罪，那么在总统任期的剩余时间里，也许在下一个任期里，没有什么能保护公众免受腐败的行政行为的犯罪。

最后一种可能性更令人担忧。也许司法部已经悄悄地决定现任总统作为他的私人律师最近争论过在曼哈顿的州法院，不仅仅是在他任职期间免于起诉——这是许多法律学者长期以来的假设——而且甚至免于所有的刑事调查。这一大胆的论点被广泛批评为与国家历史和宪法共识完全不符。

尽管如此，司法部面对越来越多的总统犯罪证据保持沉默，这确实增加了这种明显的可能性。

罗杰·帕洛夫是新闻周刊和雅虎金融。他是一名不再执业的律师，30多年来一直从事法律事务写作。

更正(11/4下午4:05):这个故事的早期版本拼错了一个名字:它是保罗·罗森斯威格，保罗·罗森斯威格。新闻周刊对这个错误表示遗憾。

 

TRUMP MAY HAVE BROKEN FEDERAL BRIBERY LAWS IN THE UKRAINE SCANDAL—BUT WHAT WILL HIS JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DO ABOUT IT?

A Washington Post article this weekend reported a new strategy that Republican Senators are running up the flag pole as they prepare for President Trump's nearly certain impeachment trial. They might admit "Trump's quid pro quo on Ukraine," but argue that it "was not illegal" or worthy of impeachment.

This not only makes no sense legally, but highlights an increasingly urgent question that too few people are asking. Now that the snowballing evidence of quid pro quo has become so rock solid that even Trump's most die-hard stalwarts feel political pressure to concede it, a question begs to be answered: Why hasn't the Department of Justice opened a formal criminal inquiry into Trump's conduct?

"The facts as we now know them sketch out the possibility of a criminal violation of the anti-bribery statute," says Paul Rosenzweig, a former senior counsel in Independent Counsel Ken Starr's Whitewater investigation and now a senior fellow at the R Street Institute. "Were the President anyone other than the President, that would be sufficient predication to open an investigation."

Early on, of course, shortly after the President's July 25 call to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the DOJ did take a lightning-quick look at what was then known about the call. At that time, the department found "no campaign finance violation" under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), a spokesman explained two months later to the Post. That law forbids soliciting a "thing of value" from a foreign national in connection with a federal election. "Justice Department lawyers determined that help with a government investigation could not be quantified as 'a thing of value' under the law," the Post reported.

 

US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky speak during a meeting in New York on September 25, 2019, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly.

Also early on, Democrats in Congress—perhaps wearied by the 22-month Mueller investigation—decided that, rather than get bogged down again in the technicalities of whether Trump's conduct made out a criminal offense, they'd just focus on what they saw as an obviously impeachable abuse of power and breach of public trust.

But because of that early tactical decision, it's possible to become numb to the mounting evidence of criminality.

From the outset, of course, some people took issue with the DOJ's initial conclusion that no campaign finance violation occurred.

"This idea that you have to be able to quantify to the nickel the 'thing of value'—I think that's wrong," says Stuart Gerson, a former acting United States Attorney General, the former head of the Justice Department's Civil Division under President George H.W. Bush, and, today, a partner at Epstein Becker & Green. "It's certainly arguable that getting dirt on your opponents is something valuable to you and your campaign."

But the more pressing question today is whether Trump's conduct violates the federal bribery and gratuities law: 18 USC Section 201. That's a question that DOJ does not appear to have addressed in its initial quick-look inquiry, probably because, at that time, evidence of quid pro quo was still circumstantial and speculative.

That's no longer the case. Concrete testimony from acting US ambassador to the Ukraine William B. Taylor, Jr.; Lt. Col. Alexander S. Vindman; US ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland; and National Security Council aide Timothy Morrison, together with other corroborating evidence (e.g., the Sondland-Taylor texts) and even admissions all strongly point toward a quid pro quo.

Specifically, they suggest that Trump was conditioning the release of nearly $391 million in Congressionally approved military aid to Ukraine upon Ukraine's publicly announcing a criminal probe into, among other things, the Ukrainian energy company Burisma. That probe would necessarily cast a pall on a former director there, Hunter Biden, who is the son of Joe Biden, then the front-runner to become Trump's Democratic opponent in the next presidential election. (Joe Biden was also the Democratic candidate who was then performing best against Trump in head-to-head straw polls.)

The bribery law makes it a felony for any federal "public official" to "corruptly" demand or seek "anything of value ... in return for being influenced in the performance of any official act." (The maximum sentence is 15 years.)

Apparently some of Trump's defenders want to argue that, okay, it's true that there was a quid pro quo, but Trump still didn't act "corruptly."

Of course, defendants can always make such an argument to the jury—and usually do. But here there's ample evidence of personal gain; no objective evidence of legitimate public purpose; months of furtiveness; secrecy; and consciousness of guilt. Career envoys, ambassadors, and national security staff were all kept in the dark while only a handful of political appointees and the President's personal attorney were in on what was happening. Why was the memo of the Trump-Zelensky call placed in a hyper-secure "code-word" server? Why were Vindman's corrections of the memo never incorporated into it? Why was Vindman instructed not to discuss the call? Why does Trump keep falsely insisting that the call memo was "an exact word-for-word transcript ... taken by very talented stenographers"?

Perhaps there are innocent answers to these questions—but that's why a full criminal inquiry needs to occur. If the answers to these questions don't turn out to be innocent, they raise questions about whether still other federal criminal laws have been violated—notably obstruction of justice laws.

In any case, 18 USC Section 201 also creates an easier-to-prove misdemeanor (maximum sentence: two years) which doesn't even require proof of "corrupt" intent. That section, often referred to as the "gratuities" provision, sweeps up any official who demands or seeks "anything of value personally for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such official or person." The Department of Justice ordinarily takes the position that a defendant need only act "knowingly and purposefully" to be guilty in a gratuities case.

Nobody is questioning that presidents are covered by 18 USC Section 201.

The Supreme Court has interpreted quid pro quo in a common-sense manner. "The official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in express terms," Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in a 1992 concurrence that has become a widely accepted statement of the law, "for otherwise the law's effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods."

Would the facts of this case run afoul of the same problem that DOJ found with the campaign finance law—that the "anything of value" being extracted in this instance can't be quantified?

No, according to a small mountain of case law. Courts have had plenty of occasion to address this question in cases involving 18 USC Section 201 and similarly worded federal and state bribery laws. In those contexts, courts have repeatedly found that "intangible" benefits can count as "anything of value."

" 'Thing of value' for the bribery statute is construed very broadly and can include anything of subjective value to the public official," says Randall Eliason, a former assistant U.S. attorney in Washington, DC, who teaches white collar crime at George Washington University law school. "It can include intangibles such as offers of employment, promises of future contracts, sexual favors, personal services, etc. . . . I believe a promise to investigate a political opponent would qualify."

"The term 'anything of value' ... is broad in scope and contains no language restricting its application to transactions involving money, goods, and services," the federal court of appeals in New Orleans wrote in a bribery case in 1996. "The plain meaning of the statute compels our conclusion that 'anything of value' ... includes transactions involving intangible items"—in that instance, conjugal visits at a prison.

Other hard-to-quantify services and benefits that have formed the basis of successful bribery prosecutions. These have included the granting of lenient conditions of pretrial release, the giving of commercially worthless stock that might later gain value, and—perhaps most relevant here—an agreement not to run in a primary election. My quick review of the case law suggests that at least five federal circuit courts of appeals have found the phrase "anything of value" to include intangible or hard-to-quantify benefits in bribery cases, while none has ruled otherwise.

"I think there is a solid basis for DOJ to investigate these actions as potential bribery violations," says Eliason, of George Washington University, in an email. "That would probably require the appointment of a new special counsel—and you can assess for yourself how likely that is with [Bill] Barr as Attorney General."

Gerson, on the other hand, disfavors the involvement of a special prosecutor. He is more trusting of both Barr and his department—even though he disagrees with the department's interpretation of the campaign-finance law in this case and, prior to that, took issue with Barr's characterization of the Mueller report. "I believe in the institution and the quality of the career people who are in it," he says. (As an assistant US attorney in the early 1970s, Gerson led a landmark prosecution of a sitting US senator under 18 USC Section 201.)

Gerson even wonders whether Trump's conduct might eventually come under scrutiny in an inquiry that is already underway. The Southern District of New York's current reported probe into Rudolph Giuliani for his Ukraine-related work, which has already led to the indictment of four people, might eventually require an examination of Trump's acts. "This all ties back to the Ukraine," Gerson says. "It all ties back to the same situation."

If Gerson is wrong, though, the department's inaction to date could only mean one of two other things. Perhaps the department has decided that the pending impeachment inquiry is sufficient to flesh out the facts and mete out a punishment. Certainly an impeachment inquiry is appropriate. Bribery is an explicit constitutional grounds for impeachment ("treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors"), as Eliason points out. And since the "thing of value" involved here was coming from the Ukraine, Gerson notes, it could be a foreign emolument, too—yet another basis for impeachment.

But the absence of a parallel criminal inquiry tends to demean the seriousness of the allegations in the eyes of both the public and the impeachment jurors—the Senators. And if the President is ultimately acquitted of impeachment articles by political allies fearful of facing primary opponents, nothing will protect the public from criminally corrupt executive acts for the remainder of this presidential term and, perhaps, the next.

The last possibility is more concerning still. Maybe the Justice Department has quietly decided that a sitting President is, as his personal lawyers recently argued in state court in Manhattan, not merely immune from prosecution during his term—which many legal scholars have long assumed—but immune even from all criminal investigation. That audacious contention has been widely criticized as radically at odds with the nation's history and constitutional consensus.

Still, the department's silence in the face of mounting evidence of Presidential criminality does raise that distinct possibility.

Roger Parloff is a regular contributor to Newsweek and Yahoo Finance. He is an attorney who no longer practices, and who has been writing about legal matters for more than 30 years.

Correction (11/4 4:05p.m.): An earlier version of this story misspelled a name: it is Paul Rosenzweig as Paul Rozensweig. Newsweek regrets the error.