周一，伊朗举行了国家组织的集会，纪念美国驻德黑兰大使馆遇袭40周年。当时，充满革命热情的激进分子试图将美国的影响力赶出这个新生的国家。
第二天，最高领袖阿亚图拉·鲁霍拉·霍梅尼宣布美国为“伟大的撒旦，受伤的蛇”这场革命——以“美国去死”为最突出的口号——推翻了广受厌恶的沙阿·穆罕默德·礼萨·巴列维，他本人也是在1953年由西方发起的政变中上台的。
人质危机今天正在损害美国和伊朗的关系。然而很少有人理解
德黑兰的大使馆仍然保留着，尽管它周围的墙壁现在被反美涂鸦和壁画所覆盖。这座建筑本身现在有一个博物馆，名为美国间谍馆。
前外交使团象征着自革命以来一直污染着美国和伊朗关系的反感和不信任。尽管有一些美好的时刻，这种关系仍然陷于敌意之中。
过去40年间，闪光点不断涌现。人质危机立即恶化了伊斯兰共和国和美国之间的关系。僵局最终持续到444天，在此期间，美国军队试图灾难性救援行动导致八名美国士兵死亡。
美国支持伊拉克总统萨达姆·侯赛因在伊朗漫长而血腥的战争中，华盛顿强调了对德黑兰新政权的蔑视。
这张摄于1979年11月9日的照片显示，活动分子占领德黑兰美国大使馆几天后，示威者在大使馆周围的墙上焚烧美国国旗。
20世纪80年代也见证了伊朗资助的袭击美国在黎巴嫩和沙特阿拉伯造成数百名美国人死亡伊朗客机在伊朗-伊拉克冲突的“油轮战争”期间，美国的一艘巡洋舰袭击了伊朗。
伊朗展示核能力，宣布削减更多核武器交易
新世纪没有带来喘息的机会。9·11袭击使美国在中东地区陷得更深，乔治·布什总统将伊朗纳入他所谓的“邪恶轴心”引发了人们对该国可能成为他军事行动清单上的下一个国家的担忧。
随着美国军队陷入伊拉克占领的泥潭，德黑兰非常乐意训练、资助和武装民兵杀害美国士兵越过边境。
尽管有几十年的敌意，巴拉克·奥巴马总统的两届任期仍是美国和伊斯兰共和国关系史上为数不多的亮点之一。
2015年，两国签署了联合综合行动计划该法案对伊朗的核计划实施了限制，以换取国际社会解除对伊朗的严厉制裁。
但是对新的合作时代的希望被证明是天真的。两国保守派的强烈反对——加上持怀疑态度的美国地区盟友——阻碍了协议的达成，而制裁的经济利益是慢慢流过给伊朗人民。
正如兰德公司的高级政治学家达利娅·达斯萨·凯(Dalia Dassa Kaye)所解释的那样，交易的轨迹遵循了一种“有限”成功和最终无法实现两国“正常双边关系”的模式。
2018年5月16日，伊朗人在伊朗德黑兰前美国大使馆总部参加反美示威。
唐纳德·特朗普总统的当选是《联合行动纲领》的政变，尽管其他签署方努力维持该协定。恶毒地反奥巴马、反多边主义和反伊朗，特朗普从未掩饰他对协议的蔑视，并于2018年5月将美国从协议中撤出。
其他签署国继续支持该协议，尽管他们减轻美国随后制裁打击的能力有限。伊朗政权愤怒地采取措施，违反《联合行动纲领》的条款，削减其核能力，这让特朗普政府有更多的理由拒绝恢复遵约。
特朗普到底想要什么还不清楚。凯指出，“总统和他的高级顾问们发出了混杂的信息”，混淆了政府是希望政策调整还是德黑兰政权全面更迭。
伊朗给沙特阿拉伯写信，警告美国时代已经过去
欧洲外交关系委员会高级政策研究员埃莉·杰伦马耶赫告诉记者新闻周刊特朗普代表着“德黑兰和华盛顿之间任何和解或缓和的重大挫折”
特朗普经常表示，他希望与德黑兰达成新协议，但杰兰马耶赫指出，他的“行动和行为将伊朗推得更远”
这种情况对伊朗的强硬派也是一种恩惠，他们中的许多人从来不相信华盛顿会兑现承诺。回到2015年，温和派胜出。但是四年后，伊朗几乎没有表现出自己的努力，而且——根据大多数人的说法——遵守了《联合行动纲领》。
杰伦马耶赫解释说:“领导层中一直在推动至少与美国建立交易关系的那个阵营，已经被逼入绝境，被边缘化了，因为他们的手指被烧伤了。”。
特朗普政府是伊朗反美宣传的具体化。因此，该政权对外部敌人的无时无刻不在的需求正得到白宫的“证实”，这支持了德黑兰的神权国家，该国近年来在统一的表面上出现了明显的裂痕。
青年商会的缓慢消亡加剧了中东的紧张局势。油轮遭到轰炸，美国及其盟国的设施成为目标，一架美国无人驾驶飞机被击落。
2018年5月9日，伊朗德黑兰，伊朗示威者在美国前大使馆前焚烧唐纳德·特朗普总统的照片。
据报道，美国正处于对伊朗军事阵地空袭的边缘，但是特朗普把飞机叫了回来在最后一刻。
凯认为，这种不稳定是白宫战略失败的证据。
“伊朗面临的日益增长的经济压力——没有明显的出口——并没有导致‘更好的’协议，也没有导致政权更迭，”她解释道。“它导致的是更危险的伊朗活动以石油供应和区域伙伴为目标。"
“更糟糕的是，伊朗已经开始违背其在核协议中的承诺，越过浓缩活动和离心机开发的限制，”凯继续说道。“很难看出这些发展是如何为美国利益或地区稳定带来胜利的。
伊朗年轻、自由、受过良好教育的城市人口受到了很多关注。许多观察家和政治家希望，随着该国革命一代的死亡，这一阶层将夺取政权，并成为与西方关系紧张的软肋。
利昂·帕内塔称特朗普的叙利亚行动是总统犯下的最严重的外交错误
但是，《联合行动纲领》的惨败可能会玷污这一理论化的进程，给反美情绪注入一针强心剂，更多的是受民族主义而非宗教狂热的驱动。
杰伦马耶赫建议特朗普的政策可能“不仅对伊朗领导层，而且对广大民众的心理产生一代人的影响”。
“我的感觉是，退出核协议将是两国关系中的另一个分水岭，”她补充道。“即使再过10年、20年，你也可能会让伊朗决策者指出这样一个事实，即由于特朗普对协议所做的这一历史性例子，美国不能真正得到信任。”
如果特朗普真的想要一项新的核协议，时间不多了。2020年的竞选已经占据了美国的头条新闻，特朗普越来越被民主党弹劾调查所吞噬。与此同时，伊朗拒绝考虑新的会谈。
白宫在其他谈判中缺乏成功——例如与中国和朝鲜的谈判——表明与伊朗的突破不太可能突然实现。德黑兰和其他国家一样，很可能会等待政府决定谁将在2021年1月成为总司令。
但是，即使它是一个渴望重新参与的民主党人，成功也远没有保证。在伊朗总统选举进程开始之前，新总统不会花很长时间与德黑兰坐下来，从而中断任何讨论，重组任何谈判团队。
任何新的民主党总统也将不得不与一个强烈反对与伊朗外交的痛苦共和党斗争。2020年的选举被认为是美国历史上最肮脏和两极分化的选举之一——到下一届政府开始时，两党关系可能会破裂，不管谁在椭圆形办公室。
不会有快速的解决办法。联合行动纲领进程始于2000年，需要多个行政部门和失败的几轮谈判才能取得成功。奥巴马和伊朗总统哈桑·鲁哈尼达成了一项协议，但杰兰马耶赫警告说，“这种结盟可能实际上需要数年才能再次出现。”
凯对此表示赞同，并得出结论说，“鉴于双方信任的破裂和已经根深蒂固的敌意，我们不应该指望美伊关系在短期内有所突破。”
TRUMP'S TREATMENT OF IRAN WILL ENSURE AMERICA REMAINS THE 'GREAT SATAN' FOR DECADES TO COME
State-organized rallies were held in Iran on Monday to mark the 40th anniversary of the storming of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, when activists—flushed with revolutionary zeal—sought to drive American influence out of the reborn country.
The next day, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared America "the Great Satan, the wounded snake." The revolution—with "Death to America" among its most prominent slogans—overthrew the widely disliked Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, himself installed in a Western-sponsored coup in 1953.
The Hostage Crisis Is Harming U.S.-Iran Relations Today. Yet Few Understand
The embassy building in Tehran remains, though the wall surrounding it is now covered in anti-American graffiti and murals. The building itself now houses a museum called the U.S. Den of Espionage.
The former diplomatic mission stands as a symbol to the antipathy and mistrust that has tainted U.S.-Iranian relations since the revolution. And despite some bright moments, the relationship remains bogged in hostility.
The past 40 years have been punctuated with flash points. The hostage crisis immediately soured relations between the Islamic Republic and the U.S. The standoff eventually stretched to 444 days, during which American forces attempted a disastrous rescue operation that left eight U.S. soldiers dead.
American support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein during his country's long and bloody war with Iran underscored Washington's disdain for the new regime in Tehran.
This photo taken on November 9, 1979, shows demonstrators atop the wall surrounding the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, burning an American flag days after activists seized the facility.
The 1980s also saw Iranian-funded attacks on U.S. in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia which killed hundreds of Americans, plus the downing of an Iranian passenger jet by a U.S. cruiser amid the "tanker war" period of the Iran-Iraq conflict, in which American forces clashed repeatedly with the Iranians.
Iran Shows Off Nuclear Capabilities, Announces More Nuke Deal Scale-Backs
The new century brought no respite. The 9/11 attacks sucked America deeper in the Middle East, and President George W. Bush's inclusion of Iran in his so-called "Axis of Evil" raised fears that the country might be next on his list of military actions.
As American forces sank into the quagmire of the Iraqi occupation, Tehran was more than happy to train, fund and arm militias that killed U.S. soldiers across the border.
Despite decades of enmity, President Barack Obama's two terms delivered one of the few bright sparks in the history of U.S.-Islamic Republic relations.
In 2015, the two nations signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which introduced restrictions on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for relief from crippling international sanctions.
But hopes of a fresh era of cooperation were to prove naive. A backlash from conservatives in both nations—plus skeptical regional U.S. allies—hampered the deal, and the economic benefits of sanctions relief were slow to trickle through to the Iranian people.
As Dalia Dassa Kaye, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, explained, the trajectory of the deal followed a pattern of "limited" successes and ultimate failure to realize "normalized bilateral relations" between the two nations.
Iranians take part in an anti-U.S. demonstration inside the former U.S. embassy headquarters in Tehran, Iran on May 16, 2018.
The election of President Donald Trump served as the coup de grâce for the JCPOA, despite efforts by the other signatories to keep the accord alive. Virulently anti-Obama, anti-multilateralism and anti-Iran, Trump never hid his disdain for the agreement, and withdrew the U.S. from it in May 2018.
The other signatories have maintained their support for the agreement, though they were limited in their ability to soften the blow of subsequent U.S. sanctions. Furious, the Iranian regime has taken steps to spool up its nuclear capacity in violation of the JCPOA's terms, giving the Trump administration yet more reasons to refuse to return to compliance.
It remains unclear exactly what Trump is after. Kaye pointed to the "mixed messages coming from the president and his top advisers," obfuscating whether the administration desires policy reorientation or full regime change in Tehran.
Iran Writes Letter to Saudi Arabia, Warns U.S. Its Time Has Passed
Ellie Geranmayeh, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations told NewsweekTrump represents "a major setback to any sort of rapprochement or detente between Tehran and Washington."
Trump regularly says he wants to reach a new deal with Tehran, but Geranmayeh noted that his "actions and his behavior have pushed Iran further away."
The situation has also been a boon to Iran's hardliners, many of whom never trusted that Washington would deliver on its promises. Back in 2015, the moderates won out. But four years later Iran has little to show for its efforts and—by most accounts—compliance with the JCPOA.
"That camp within the leadership that had been pushing for at least a transactional relationship with the United States, has been really cornered and marginalized because they've had their fingers burned," Geranmayeh explained.
The Trump administration is the materialization of Iranian anti-American propaganda. The regime's ever-present need for an external enemy is thus "being validated" by the White House, bolstering Tehran's theocratic state which in recent years has shown significant cracks in unified facade.
The slow death of the JCPOA has ratcheted up tensions in the Middle East. Tankers have been bombed, U.S. and allied facilities targeted and an American drone shot down.
Iranian demonstrators burn a picture of President Donald Trump during a protest in front of the former U.S. embassy on May 9, 2018 in Tehran, Iran.
The U.S. was reportedly on the verge of airstrikes on Iranian military positions, but Trump called the aircraft back at the last moment.
Such instability is evidence of a failed White House strategy, Kaye argued.
"The growing economic pressure on Iran—with no apparent off-ramp—has not led to a 'better' deal and has not led to regime change," she explained. "What it has led to is more dangerous Iranian activity in the region targeting oil supplies and regional partners."
"To make matters worse, Iran has begun to walk back from its commitments in the nuclear deal, crossing limits on enrichment activity and centrifuge development," Kaye continued. "It's hard to see how any of these developments are a win for U.S. interests or regional stability."
Much has been made of Iran's young, liberal, well-educated, urban population. Many observers and politicians hoped this strata would take the reigns as the country's revolutionary generation died away, and serve as an ointment to testy relations with the West.
Leon Panetta Says Trump's Syria Move Is Worst Foreign Mistake by President
But the JCPOA fiasco might yet taint this theorized progression, giving anti-America sentiment a shot in the arm, driven more by nationalism that religious fervor.
Geranmayeh suggested Trump's policies could have "almost a generational impact on the psyche of not just the Iranian leadership, but also the population at large," Geranmayeh suggested.
"My sense is that the withdrawal from the nuclear deal will be another kind of watershed moment in the relationship," she added. "Even 10 years, 20 years down the line, you're probably going to get Iranian policymakers pointing out the fact that the U.S. cannot really be trusted because of this historic example of what Trump did to the agreement."
If Trump does indeed want a new nuclear deal, time is running out. The 2020 race is already dominating U.S. headlines, and Trump is becoming ever-more consumed by the Democratic impeachment investigation. Meanwhile, Iran is refusing to consider new talks.
The White House's lack of success with other negotiations—e.g. with China and North Korea—suggest a breakthrough with Iran is unlikely to suddenly materialize. Tehran, like other nations, could well wait out the administration to see who will be commander in chief in January 2021.
But even if it is a Democrat keen on re-engagement, success is far from guaranteed. A new president will not have long to sit down with Tehran before Iran's presidential election process kicks off, putting the breaks on any discussions and reshuffling any negotiating team.
Any new Democratic president would also have to grapple with a bitter Republican Party vehemently opposed to any diplomacy with Iran. The 2020 election is tipped to be one of the dirtiest and polarizing in U.S. history—bipartisan relations could be in tatters by the start of the next administration, regardless of who is in the Oval Office.
There will be no quick fix. The JCPOA process began in 2000, requiring multiple administrations and failed rounds of negotiations to achieve success. Obama and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani got a deal over the line, but Geranmayeh warned "it might actually take years before that alignment is seen again."
Kaye concurred, concluding that "given the breakdown of trust and the already deeply rooted animosity on both sides, we should not expect a breakthrough in U.S.-Iranian relations anytime soon."
