在美国，我们通过选举团而不是全国普选来选举总统和副总统。要想获胜，一个政党的候选人必须在足够多的州赢得最多的选票，以获得绝对多数的选举人票——至少在总共538张选票中获得270张(听起来很熟悉吧?).
但隐藏在这一总体数字中的是，在269票对269票的情况下，没有候选人赢得多数席位的可能性。虽然看起来不会在2024年的选举中发挥作用，但第三方也有可能赢得足够的选举人票，以阻止任何人达到270票。不管发生了什么，如果没有竞争者获得多数席位，宪法要求国会通过“临时选举”来选择我们的国家行政人员。在这种情况下，美国众议院将选择总统，尽管不是基于整个众议院的投票，而是基于每个州的偏好——这意味着候选人需要获得50个州代表团中26个州代表团的多数支持才能获胜——而拥有100个席位的美国参议院将根据个别参议员的投票选择副总统，需要51票才能获胜。
我们会在2024年总统竞选中遇到这种情况吗?这是可能的，尽管可能性不大:根据538的总统预测，副总统卡玛拉·哈里斯和前总统唐纳德·川普都没有获得270张选举人票的可能性只有大约300分之一，这里唯一可能的情况是269比269的平局，根据当前的竞选状态，关键的摇摆州以似乎不太可能的方式转变。考虑到这一点，让我们看看我们如何结束总统和副总统的临时选举，以及为什么这样的发展会严重有利于共和党人。
哈里斯和特朗普怎么会都少于270分
在538的总统预测中，哈里斯和特朗普并列的少数情景中，有四种情景是迄今为止最有可能的，约占这些罕见情况的五分之四。在每个州，哈里斯将获得价值225张选举人票的州和国会选区，而特朗普将获得219张。这使得七个主要战场州——亚利桑那州、佐治亚州、密歇根州、内华达州、北卡罗来纳州、宾夕法尼亚州和威斯康星州——以及内布拉斯加州第二选区的94张选举人票可能会出现平局，这四个州的竞选结果各不相同，如下表所示。
这四种情况中的三种涉及三个北部摇摆州中的至少两个转移到共和党阵营，而南部和西部的大多数最终掌握在民主党手中。这与我们目前的预测有些不符，我们目前的预测让特朗普在阳光地带比在霜冻地带更有可能翻转州。
其中，情景1是最常见的——然而，只有大约1/1000的可能性——并且涉及特朗普抓住北卡罗来纳州，翻转宾夕法尼亚州和密歇根州，而哈里斯保留了威斯康星州、亚利桑那州、佐治亚州和内华达州，不包括拜登总统2020年的竞选结果。其次最常见的是情景2(约为1/1200)，其中包括几乎相同的结果，只是哈里斯和特朗普交易了佐治亚州和北卡罗来纳州相同的选举人票。场景3有大约1/1600的可能性——在其中，特朗普收回了太阳带州和内布拉斯加州的第二选区，而哈里斯保住了北部的三个战场。场景4是这四个场景中可能性最小的一个(大约有1/2000的机会)，但它涉及特朗普赢得所有北部战场和内华达州，而哈里斯赢得三个南部摇摆州。
除了这些情况之外，还存在一些更遥远的可能性，但它们发生的几率约为万分之一(或更低)。其中，在我们预测的大约34，000次模拟中，唯一出现至少两次的是四组逐州结果，其中倾向于民主党的新罕布什尔州或弗吉尼亚州成为共和党，而七个关键摇摆州的结果各不相同(尽管密歇根州在所有四个州都仍然属于民主党)。在其他12个产生平局的模拟中，有两个涉及缅因州倾向于红色的第二选区转向民主党。
现在，538的预测假设选举人票将根据选举结果流向赢得选举人票的候选人——但是这不是百分之百的肯定。例如，在2020年，少数几个州的共和党人投票支持拜登试图提交假冒共和党选举人到国会支持特朗普毫无根据的主张他真的赢得了选举。和大约三分之二的众议院共和党人投票反对认证结果亚利桑那州和宾夕法尼亚州中的一个或两个。虽然这些破坏2020年选举的企图最终失败了，但它们也肯定会在2024年发挥作用。
此外，选举团的选举人有一些回旋的余地投票给任何他们想要的人，意味着一个“背信弃义的选民“可以拒绝投他们期望支持的票。例如，在2016年，五名民主党选举人和两名共和党选举人没有投票但却投了其他候选人的票。如果选举结果像269-269的平局或其他非常接近的情况一样取决于每个选举人，那么一个不忠实的选举人不太可能投出相当于抗议票的票——但不能绝对排除这种可能性。
众议院将如何选举总统
如果国会在2025年1月6日开会时发现没有多数票，以证明选举人团的结果，第十二修正案要求众议院“立即”从不超过三名赢得最多选举人票的候选人中选出总统。在269比269的平局中，这将意味着只有两个主要政党的提名人(尽管一个不忠实的选举人场景可能会在技术上引入第三个候选人)。然而，这一选择并不是基于众议院435名议员的简单投票，而是通过一个独特的系统来决定的，根据该系统，每个州根据该州众议院代表团每个成员的偏好投一票——除非有成员与其政党决裂，否则代表团票数相等的州可能无法投票。要赢得选举，候选人必须赢得大多数州代表团(26个)。
根据这些规则，共和党人可能会在这次总统选举中占据优势。538的房子预测显示了对众议院总体控制权的激烈竞争(当然，这取决于哪个政党控制更多的个人席位)，但共和党比民主党更有可能在下届国会中拥有来自至少26个州的众议院代表团的优势。目前，共和党在26个州拥有大多数众议院席位，而民主党只有22个，另外两个州(明尼苏达州和北卡罗来纳州)平分秋色。然而，如果我们采用538的预测，并根据最具竞争力的席位的种族评级对每个州进行评级，这将改变政党的控制权，共和党似乎有望控制多达28个州的代表团，民主党将在1月份获得18个，其他四个州被评为胜负难料或可能有平局的代表团。
根据这一指标，共和党人目前至少有一个州代表团对他们有利，可能更多。多亏了共和党绘制的新国会地图在北卡罗来纳州，共和党几乎肯定会将该州从7比7的平局转变为至少10比4的共和党优势。共和党也可能有机会拿下密歇根州，在那里民主党7-6的领先优势看起来很脆弱由于两个摇摆不定的民主党席位共和党人希望推翻这一结果。此外，共和党只需要在阿拉斯加、宾夕法尼亚或弗吉尼亚翻转一个竞争激烈的席位，就可以控制这些州的众议院代表团，而在科罗拉多州和缅因州做同样的事情，就会在目前由民主党人控制的州产生并列的代表团。
与此同时，在总统选举在选举团中产生269-269平局的政治环境下，民主党人没有获得26个州代表团的真正途径。在最好的情况下，他们可以希望保住目前的州——除了北卡罗来纳州——并翻转亚利桑那州两个由共和党控制的竞争席位，从而保持在22个州。但是，如果民主党人做得比这更好——比如通过翻转爱荷华州、蒙大拿州和/或威斯康星州等州的共和党倾向席位，以潜在地追平这些代表团——这可能会表明民主党人总体上做得足够好，哈里斯正在赢得选票，使可能的选举算术纯粹是学术性的。
我们只有一个总统选举的先例:1824年的总统竞选。*那时，民主党-共和党(当时被称为共和党，但与今天的政党无关)占据主导政治地位在其中竞争对手联邦党的衰落。结果，四个独立的民主共和党人参加了总统竞选。为了获胜，候选人需要261张选举人票中的131张，但是每个竞争者都没有达到那个标准当前位置安德鲁·杰克森将军获得99张选举人票，国务卿约翰·昆西·亚当斯获得84张选举人票，财政部长威廉·克劳福德获得41张选举人票，众议院议长·亨利·克莱以37张选举人票位居第四。
当众议院于1825年2月聚集在一起选择总统时，它只能考虑杰克逊、亚当斯和克劳福德——选举人票的前三名。虽然都是民主共和党，党有内部分歧最终会分裂成新的政党制度到了1828年的选举，众议院的投票很大程度上遵循了这些分歧。决定选举的众议院议长克莱认为亚当斯最符合他的政治观点公开支持他。因此，来自支持克莱的州的众议员大多转向了亚当斯的阵营，这使得亚当斯赢得了他获得总统职位所需的13个州。(杰克逊的支持者很快争辩说亚当斯和克莱已经达成了一个协议。)腐败交易，“藉此克莱成为亚当斯的国务卿来换取克莱的支持。1828年，杰克逊后来打败了亚当斯在一场势均力敌的复赛中。)
除了它的年龄和不寻常的政治背景，还有其他原因，这个200年前的案件可能不会成为现代临时选举的先例。首先，由于第二十修正案新当选的众议院将选举总统，而不是1825年卸任的国会，当时新国会在3月初而不是1月3日开始工作。
2025年1月众议院面临的选择可能也比两个世纪前众议院面临的决定更直接。虽然众议院不得不整理一场涉及1825年表面上来自同一个政党的三个选项的选举，但这一次很可能会权衡来自明显对立政党的两个候选人——今天众议院的两党分歧显而易见。因此，很难想象任何民主党人或共和党人会在临时选举中决定投票给对方的候选人，这一举动可能会有效地结束叛逃者的政治生涯在党派之争激烈的时候—尤其是如果投票是公开的。(1825年，众议院选择进行临时选举在非公开程序中使用无记名投票，但个人成员的偏好很快成为众所周知的事情.)
参议院如何选举副总统
哈里斯成为她所在政党的旗手只是副总统职位有多重要的最新证明——如果没有副总统候选人在选举团中获得多数席位，将由参议院决定谁来填补这一关键职位。与众议院不同，参议院的临时选举投票将基于众议院的整体投票，候选人需要100票中的51票才能获胜。此外，参议院只能考虑获得选举人票最多的两个人，所以即使一名不忠的选举人投票给另一名副总统候选人，参议院也会发现自己在主要政党的竞选伙伴之间进行选择:俄亥俄州参议员万斯(J.D. Vance)和明尼苏达州州长瓦尔兹(Tim Walz)。
这参议院数学有利于共和党赢得副总统的临时选举，因为他们在控制上议院的竞争中似乎处于优势。目前，民主党人以51比49的比例占据多数，包括与他们进行党团会议的四名无党派人士。但是共和党人是基本保证在暗红色的西弗吉尼亚州获得一个民主党控制的席位以达到50-50。接下来，民主党参议员乔恩·特斯是至少是一个小小的失败者在倾向共和党的蒙大拿州赢得连任，而民主党参议员谢罗德·布朗正在进行一场胜负难分的比赛保住他在俄亥俄州的席位。此外，民主党人正在努力捍卫关键总统摇摆州的五个席位(亚利桑那州,密歇根,内华达州,宾夕法尼亚州和威斯康星州)，这也可能为共和党带来一些成果。最重要的是，民主党只有很小的机会在德克萨斯州和佛罗里达州获得共和党控制的席位。
现在，参议院的数学可能不会像众议院那样简单，因为共和党核心小组将包括一些更公开批评特朗普的参议员。例如，三名共和党参议员谁投票弹劾特朗普1月6日事件后，路易斯安那州的比尔·卡西迪、缅因州的苏珊·科林斯和阿拉斯加州的莉萨·穆尔科斯基今年1月仍将在任。其中一个(尤其是穆尔科斯基，2022年连任阿拉斯加的优先选择投票系统)可能会在临时选举中投票反对万斯。尽管如此，共和党更有可能占上风。
话虽如此，众议院选举总统过程中的任何意外延迟也可能给参议院的局面蒙上阴影。根据第12修正案，如果众议院未能在就职日(1月20日)之前选出总统，参议院选择的副总统将担任代理总统，直到众议院选出总统。如果参议院也未能选出副总统，总统继承法要求众议院议长是下一个担任代理总统。(假设个人符合总统资格要求和那栋房子能够选择一个—后者没有很容易发生最近一段时间。)
只有一次参议院不得不选举副总统，不，实际上不是在1824-25年众议院不得不选举总统。在那次选举中，参议员约翰·卡尔霍恩赢得多数选票从主要支持杰克逊或亚当斯竞选总统的选民中选出。相反，有一次参议院当选副总统那是在1837年2月，在1836年大选之后，由于党内不喜欢获胜的总统候选人民主党人马丁·范·布伦的竞选搭档理查德·门特·约翰逊，没有副总统候选人赢得大多数选举人票。
在1836年的选举中，范布伦-约翰逊的选票携带状态值170张选举人票，超过了获胜所需的294张选举人票中的148张。然而，尽管弗吉尼亚州的23名民主党选举人投票给了范布伦，但他们投票给了另一位副总统候选人，使约翰逊仅以147张选举人票的微弱优势获得多数票。肯塔基州众议员、前参议员约翰逊疏远了他党内的一些人尤其是在南方，由于他与一个被奴役的黑人妇女的习惯法婚姻。然而，一个主要是党派投票在参议院，约翰逊以33票对16票轻松当选副总统。然而，约翰逊的政治困境仍在继续，因为民主党人拒绝重新提名他在1840年的大会上，虽然他担任了该党事实上的被提名人在大多数州范布伦竞选连任失败.
***
这不太可能，但也不是不可能，我们会发现自己处于一个国会必须决定下一任总统和副总统的境地。但正如1824年至1825年的例子所显示的，决定下一任白宫主人的临时选举可能会带来大量的争议和不满，这可能会持续多年。
脚注
* 1800年选举的选举团结果还需要房子来选择总统，但那发生在第12修正案通过之前(那次选举加速了它的实施)，所以1824年的总统选举是根据今天的规则进行的唯一一次总统选举。
更正(东部时间2024年10月22日上午10:15):这篇文章原本说，2021年投票弹劾特朗普的两位共和党参议员，2025年1月仍会在参议院。没有包括路易斯安那州参议员比尔·卡西迪，所以这个数字实际上是三个。
What would happen if Harris and Trump tie in the Electoral College?
In the United States, we elect our president and vice president using the Electoral College rather than the national popular vote. To win, a party’s ticket must win the most votes in enough states to attain an outright majority of electoral votes — at least 270 votes out of a total of 538 (sound familiar?).
But lurking in that overall figure is the potential for no candidate to win a majority, in the case of a 269-to-269 tie. While seemingly not in play in the 2024 election, it’s also possible that third parties could win sufficient electoral votes to prevent anyone from hitting 270. Regardless of how it happens, should no contender claim a majority,the Constitution callsfor Congress to carry out the selection of our national executives via a “contingent election.” In this scenario, the U.S. House of Representatives would choose the president, although based not on the vote of the whole chamber but each state’s preferences — meaning a candidate needs majority support from 26 state delegations out of 50 to win — and the 100-seat U.S. Senate would pick the vice president based on the vote of individual senators, with 51 votes needed to win.
Could we run into this situation in the 2024 presidential race? It’s possible, though pretty unlikely: According to538’s presidential forecast, there’s only about a 1-in-300 chance that neither Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump attain 270 electoral votes, and the only plausible scenarios here involve a 269-269 tie in which key swing states shift in ways that appear less likely based on the current state of the race. With that in mind, let’s take a look at how we could end up with contingent elections for president and vice president, and why such a development would heavily favor Republicans.
How Harris and Trump could both end up shy of 270
Of the small number of scenarios in 538’s presidential forecast in which Harris and Trump tie, four scenarios are by far the most plausible, making up about 4 in 5 of those rare cases. In each, Harris would capture states and congressional districts worth 225 electoral votes, while Trump would capture 219. That leaves the 94 electoral votes in the seven principal battleground states — Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin — as well as Nebraska’s 2nd District in play for a possible tie, with the outcomes in those contests varying across all four cases, as shown in the table below.
Three of these four scenarios involve at least two of the three northern swing states shifting into the GOP column while the southern and western ones mostly end up in Democratic hands. That is somewhat at odds with our current forecast, which gives Trump a slightly better chance of flipping states in the Sun Belt than in the Frost Belt.
Of these, Scenario 1 is the most common — only with about a 1-in-1,000 shot of happening, however — and involves Trump holding onto North Carolina and flipping Pennsylvania and Michigan, while Harris retains Wisconsin, Arizona, Georgia and Nevada from President Biden’s 2020 showing. Next-most common is Scenario 2 (about a 1-in-1,200 shot), which includes mostly the same results, except with Harris and Trump trading Georgia and North Carolina’s identical electoral votes. Scenario 3, has about a 1-in-1,600 shot of happening — In it, Trump reclaims the Sun Belt states and Nebraska’s 2nd District while Harris holds onto the three northern battlegrounds. Scenario 4 is the least likely of this quartet (about a 1-in-2,000 chance), but it involves Trump carrying all the northern battlegrounds and Nevada while Harris wins the three southern swing states.
Beyond these scenarios, a handful of even more remote possibilities exist, but they have about a 1-in-10,000 (or worse) chance of occurring. Of those, the only ones that happen at least twice in our forecast’s roughly 34,000 simulations are four sets of state-by-state results in which Democratic-leaning New Hampshire or Virginia go Republican, while the outcomes in the seven key swing states vary (although Michigan remains in the Democratic column in all four). Out of the 12 other simulations that produce a tie, two involve Maine’s red-leaning 2nd District going Democratic.
Now, 538’s forecast assumes that electoral votes will go to the candidate who has won them based on the election results — butthat’s not a 100-percent given. In 2020, for instance, Republicans in a handful of states that voted for Bidenattempted to submitfake Republican electors to Congress in support of Trump’sunfounded claimsthat he’d actually won the election. And about two-thirds of House Republicansvoted against certifying the resultsin one or both of Arizona and Pennsylvania. While these attempts to disrupt the 2020 election ultimately failed, they could definitely come into play in 2024, too.
Additionally, the electors of the Electoral College havesome room for maneuverto cast votes for whomever they want, meaning a “faithless elector” could refuse to cast their vote for the ticket they were expected to support. For instance, in 2016, five Democratic electors and two Republican electorsdid not cast their votesfor their party tickets but instead voted for other candidates. If an election outcome were to hang on every elector like in a 269-269 tie or another very close scenario, it’s unlikely that a faithless elector would cast what would amount to a protest vote — but it can’t absolutely be ruled out.
How the House would elect a president
If Congress finds the absence of a majority when it gathers on Jan. 6, 2025, to certify the Electoral College results,the 12th Amendmentcalls for the House to “immediately” choose the president from no more than the three candidates who won the most electoral votes. In a 269-269 tie, that would mean just the two major-party nominees (though a faithless elector scenario could technically introduce a third candidate). However, the choice is not based on a simple vote by the House’s 435 members as a whole, but instead is decided through a unique system whereby each state casts one vote according to the preferences of each member of that state’s House delegation — with states that have tied delegations potentially unable to cast a vote unless a member breaks with their party. To win, a candidate must win a majority of state delegations (26).
Under these rules, Republicans would likely hold an edge in this contingent election for president.538’s House forecastshows a tight race for overall control of the House (which, of course, is based on which party controls more individual seats), but Republicans are far more likely than the Democrats to have an edge in the House delegations from at least 26 states in the next Congress. Currently, Republicans hold a majority of the House seats in 26 states compared with the Democrats’ 22, while two others (Minnesota and North Carolina) are tied. Yet if we take 538’s forecast and rate each state based on the race rating of its most competitive seat that would change party control, the GOP looks favored to control as many as 28 state delegations to Democrats’ 18 come January, with the four other states rated as toss-ups or likely to have tied delegations.
Based on this metric, Republicans are currently positioned to flip at least one state delegation in their favor, and possibly more. Thanks to anew Republican-drawn congressional mapin North Carolina, the GOP is all but certain to shift that state from a 7-7 tied delegation to one with at least a 10-4 Republican edge. The GOP may also have a shot at capturing Michigan, where Democrats’ 7-6 lead looks tenuousdue to two swingy Democratic-held seatsthat Republicans hope to flip. And, the GOP needs to flip only one highly competitive seat in Alaska, Pennsylvania or Virginia to control the House delegations in those states, while doing the same in Colorado and Maine would produce tied delegations in states currently held by Democrats.
Meanwhile, Democrats have no real path to 26 state delegations in a political environment where the presidential election produces a 269-269 tie in the Electoral College. At best, they could hope to hold onto their current states — save North Carolina — and flip two competitive Republican-held seats in Arizona to remain at 22 states. But if Democrats did better than that — say by flipping GOP-leaning seats in states such as Iowa, Montana and/or Wisconsin to potentially tie those delegations — that would probably signal that Democrats are doing well enough overall that Harris is winning at the top of the ticket, making the contingent election arithmetic purely academic.
We have only one precedent for a contingent election for president: the 1824 presidential race.* At that time,the Democratic-Republicans(known then as the Republicans but unrelated to today’s party)held a dominant political positionamidthe decline of the rival Federalist Party. As a result, four separate Democratic-Republicans contested the presidential race. To win, a candidate needed 131 electoral votes out of 261, butevery contender fell short of that mark: General Andrew Jackson won 99 electoral votes, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams captured 84 electoral votes, Secretary of the Treasury William Crawford earned 41 electoral votes and House Speaker Henry Clay came in fourth with 37 electoral votes.
When the House gathered in February 1825 to choose a president, it could only consider Jackson, Adams and Crawford — the top-three recipients of electoral votes. While all were Democratic-Republicans, the partyhad internal divisionsthat would eventually split intoa new party systemby the 1828 election, and the votes in the House largely followed these cleavages. Clay, speaker of the chamber deciding the election, viewed Adams as most in line with his political views andpublicly backed him. Accordingly, House members from the states that had supported Clay mostly shifted to Adams’ camp, which enabled Adams to win the 13 states that he needed to attain the presidency. (Jackson’s supporters soon argued that Adams and Clay had struck a “corrupt bargain,” whereby Claybecame Adams’s secretary of statein exchange for Clay’s support. In 1828, Jacksonwent on to defeat Adamsin a head-to-head rematch.)
Beyond its age and unusual political context, there are other reasons this 200-year-old case might not serve as much of a precedent for a modern contingent election, though. For one, due tothe 20th Amendment, the newly-elected House would elect the president rather than the outgoing Congress that did the job in 1825, back at a time when the new Congress began in early March instead of on Jan. 3.
The choice that would confront the House in January 2025 would likely be more straightforward than the decision the chamber faced two centuries ago, too. While the House had to sort out an election involving three options ostensibly from the same party in 1825, it would likely be weighing two candidates from clearly opposing parties this time around — and the two-party division in the House today is readily apparent. As a result, it’s very difficult to imagine any Democrat or Republican deciding to vote for the other party’s candidate in a contingent election, a move that could effectively end the defector’s political careerat a time of intense partisanship— especially if the vote is public. (In 1825, the House chose to conduct its contingent electionin closed proceedingsusing a secret ballot, but the preferences of individual memberssoon became public knowledge.)
How the Senate would elect a vice president
Harris’s rise to become her party’s standard bearer is only the latest demonstration of how important the vice presidency is — and it’s the Senate that would decide who fills this key position if no vice presidential candidate earned a majority in the Electoral College. Unlike the House, a Senate contingent election vote would be based on a vote of the chamber as a whole, in which a candidate needs 51 of 100 votes to win. Additionally, the Senate can only consider the top two recipients of electoral votes, so even if a faithless elector casts a vote for another vice presidential candidate, the Senate would find itself picking between the major-party running mates: Ohio Sen. J.D. Vance and Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz.
TheSenate math favors Republicansto win a contingent election for vice president, too, due to their seeming edge in the race to control the upper chamber. Currently, Democrats hold a 51-to-49 majority, including the four independents who caucus with them. But Republicansareessentially guaranteedto pick up a Democratic-held seat in dark red West Virginia to get to 50-50. Next, Democratic Sen. Jon Tester isat least a slight underdogto win reelection in Republican-leaning Montana, while Democratic Sen. Sherrod Brownis in a toss-up raceto keep hold of his Ohio seat. Furthermore, Democrats are fighting to defend five seats in key presidential swing states (Arizona,Michigan,Nevada,PennsylvaniaandWisconsin), which could also bear some fruit for the GOP. On top of this, Democrats have only a small chance of capturing GOP-held seats in states like Texas and Florida.
Now, it’s possible that the Senate math would not be as straightforward as the House because the GOP caucus will include some senators who have been more openly critical of Trump. For instance, three Republican senatorswho voted to impeach Trumpafter the events of Jan. 6 — Bill Cassidy of Louisiana, Susan Collins of Maine and Lisa Murkowski of Alaska — will still be in office this January. One of them (particularly Murkowski, reelected in 2022 byAlaska’s ranked-choice voting system) might vote against Vance in a contingent election. Still, it’s more likely than not that the GOP would have the upper hand.
That being said, any unexpected delays in the House’s process to elect a president could also cloud the Senate picture. Based on the 12th Amendment, if the House fails to elect a president by Inauguration Day (Jan. 20), the Senate’s choice for vice president would serve as acting president until the House elects a president. And if the Senatealsofails to choose a vice president, the Presidential Succession Act calls for the Speaker of the Houseto be next in lineto serve as acting president. (Assuming that individual meets the presidential eligibility requirementsandthat the Houseis able to select one—the latterhasn’thappened easilyin recent times.)
Just once has the Senate had to elect a vice president, and no, it actually wasn’t in 1824-25 when the House had to elect a president. In that election, Sen. John Calhounwon a majority of votesfor the position in the Electoral College from a mix of electors who mainly backed Jackson or Adams for president. Rather, the one time the Senateelected a vice presidentwas in February 1837, following the 1836 election when no vice presidential candidate won a majority of electoral votes because of intraparty dislike for Richard Mentor Johnson, the running mate of the victorious presidential candidate, Democrat Martin Van Buren.
In the 1836 election, the Van Buren-Johnson ticketcarried states worth170 electoral votes, surpassing the necessary 148 of 294 to win. However, while Virginia’s 23 Democratic electors voted for Van Buren, they voted for a different vice presidential candidate, leaving Johnson just shy of a majority with 147 electoral votes. A Kentucky representative and former senator, Johnsonhad alienated some in his party, especially in the South, due to his common-law marriage to an enslaved Black woman. However, amostly party-line votein the Senate easily elected Johnson as vice president, 33 to 16. Johnson’s political difficulties continued, though, as the Democratsrefused to renominate himat their 1840 convention, althoughhe served as theparty’s de facto nomineein most states asVan Buren lost reelection.
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It’s quite unlikely, but not impossible, that we could find ourselves in a situation where Congress has to decide the next president and vice president. But as the 1824-25 example shows, a contingent election to decide the next occupant of the White House could bring with it ample controversy and dissatisfaction that could carry on for years to come.
Footnote
*The Electoral College result in the 1800 electionalso required the House to choosethe president, but that took place before the passage of the 12th Amendment (that electionprecipitated its implementation), so the 1824 election is the only contingent election for president to occur under the rules that would govern one today.
CORRECTION (Oct. 22, 2024, 10:15 a.m. Eastern):This article originally said that two Republican senators who voted to impeach Trump in 2021 will still be in the Senate in January 2025. That missed Louisiana Sen. Bill Cassidy, so the figure is actually three.
